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INTRODUCTION
Inventory behavior has long been analyzed as important in explaining
economic cycles at the macro level, the industry level and the firm level.1
At the firm and industry levels, inventory behavior is frequently hypothe-
sized to be motivated by the desire to maintain a constant inventory/sales
or inventory/production ratio for transactions purposes. Some version
of an accelerator model is utilized to model such transactions motives. 2
While the desire to maintain a constant inventory/sales ratio can
characterize most firms or groups of firms, whether oligopolistic or com-
petitive, the inventory behavior of an oligopoly may be expected to be
more complicated than a competitive firm's behavior because oligopoly
behavior in general is more complicated. Inventory behavior is one of
several tools used by oligopolists in pursuing pricing and production
goals. For example, in an oligopolistic industry, the participants may
set a common price reflecting their joint short-run and/or long-run goals3
while taking into account their short-run (several months) and long-run
(up to several years) perceptions regarding demand conditions, cost
conditions and potential entry. Because the group of interdependent
producers tacitly or overtly accepts the common price and because each
1 See for examples L1, 4, 6, 7, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18]
2 See for examples Lll, 13, 14, 17]
The richness of potential goals and behavior in oligopolistic
industries is well known and not explored here. See [211 for greater
discussion.
member realizes in a working oligopoly that output/price decisions governed
by narrow self-interest may be destructive, eath member of the oligopoly
will defend the group price by passive output adjustment. As a result,
production is adjusted where possible to demand levels at the accepted
price to avoid upsetting the group price. When production is not entirely
flexible and when the quantity of output collectively supplied by members
of an oligopoly does not clear the market at the established group price,
inventories (and order backlogs) can be used to defend the common price.
Thus, when demand pressures are high enough to render a maintained group
price too low for short-run equilibrium, inventories may be drawn down
to support that given price, until rationing or a price change is required.
Likewise, when oligopolists hope to maintain short-run administered prices
above the equilibrium levels, additions to inventories can be a useful
technique for helping maintain a given price structure in the face of
short-run market conditions. Such behavior is documented by Kaplan,
1Dirlam, and Lanzilotti and O'Hanlon L19J for the U.S. primary copper
producers and by Peck2 for the U.S. aluminum producers. Furthermore,
Scherer3 documents a positive relationship between the variability of
inventory/sales ratios and the levels of concentration (C4) for 23 U.S.
industry groups, thereby suggesting a more active use of inventories as
an economic tool in more concentrated (hence, potentially more oligopolis-
tic) industries.
1 [12], pp. 176-181
2 [20], pp. 88
3 [21], Chapter 5
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The purpose of this paper is to report econometric results that
confirm the transactions motives of competitive and non-competitive firms1
for holding inventories (the accelerator model with its desired inventory
sales ratio) and furthermore indicate the greater reliance of oigopolistic
firms upon inventories for other reasons. To accomplish this, the paper
develops a model of inventory behavior that incorporates a wide array of
motivations for holding and using inventories. The transactions motive
and the price maintainance motive of oligopolists mentioned above are two
of many possible motivations for holding inventories. There exist other
precautionary and speculative motives. While these motives can be and
have been worked into a number of models which include rigid and flexible
accelerator models, buffer stock models and supply of storage models [13],
Section 1 incorporates them into a "remodified" flexible accelerator model
to be applied to the inventory behavior to three groups of producers within
the U.S. copper industry. These groups and their respective inventories
are
* Primary copper producers' inventories of refined copper output
I Fabricators' and semi-fabricators' inventories of scrap and
refined copper inputs
I Secondary copper refiners' and smelters' inventories of scrap
inputs
The primary producers can be characterized as an oligopoly; the fabricators/
semi-fabricators and secondary refiners can be characterized as competitive.2
Section 2 reports the results of applying the model to all three groups.
Section 3 discusses the conclusions to be drawn.
The results reported here hold for groups of competitive or oligo-
polistic firms. However I feel there is little aggregation problem in
deducing behavioral conclusions for individual firms from the group results.
2 See [2, 3, 8, 10]. For an identification of the corporate members
of each group, see L8], Chapter 1,and [2.
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1. THE MODEL
A variant of the accelerator model is used here for both competitive
and non-competitive groups for both product and factor inventories. A
brief discussion of the forms of the accelerator is useful to indicate
how this version differs from others.
The strict accelerator assumes that inventories (I) vary directly
with output (Q), i.e., It = Qt + p t' where a is the inventory/sales ratio.
The theory applies to factor and product inventories and incorporates the
insight that stocks are held as precautionary reserves to meet production
and/or sales goals.l
This specification of inventory behavior is clearly too rigid. It
does not differentiate between desired and actual inventories nor between
planned and actual production/sales. It does not take into account lags
between inventory changes and changes in sales or production levels. The
existence of such a time lag implies that for various reasons (which should
be made explicit) 2 producers and consumers will adjust actual inventories
only partially to their equilibrium (or desired) level. Furthermore, if
firms make errors in their sales/production forecasts, discrepancies between
actual and planned inventories will occur.3 Finally, the simple rigid
accelerator above fails to explicitly take into account speculative price
expectations, the costs of holding inventories, and the use of inventories
See [13], Chapter 4; L11; [83.
2 And are not made explicit by many straightforward partial
adjustment formulations.
3 See [15], L16j, and [17]
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by oligopolists for price maintainance. Thus, although desired
inventories may be some relatively constant proportion of forecasted
output, that proportion will be sensitive to inventory price expecta-
tions, strike expectations, the costs of holding inventories and
oligopolistic price maintainance motives.
To take account of not only time lags, but also the ex post differ-
ences between output expectations and realizations and the influence
of other speculative and expectational variables. upon the assumed propor-
tionality between inventories and production, several other models have
been introduced. One improvement is a simplistic flexible accelerator
combining a simple accelerator hypothesis (la) with a simple partial
adjustment model (lb) as follows:
It = sO + 1 Qt (la)
It - It-] =l (I It -l) (lb)
or, It = 0 + a1 Qt + (1-X) It-i
where I* is the desired stocks at the beginning of period t; It is
actual stocks; and Qt is the output in the period t (or expected output
under certainty). With stochastic specification, we obtain:
It = XaO + al Qt + (l-) It 1 + t
1 See [13], pp. 64-65; [14], [5].
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Lundberg and Metzler [15-17] have developed an alternative approach
which focuses upon the use of inventories as a buffer between production
and sales. Accordingly, planned inventories are related to planned sales
and the difference between actual and planned inventories is determined
by the difference between actual and planned sales.l If data on sales
expectations 2 were available, this modelling approach could be useful for
the copper industry. They are not available. Furthermore, the more
sophisticated versions of the buffer stock model do not lend acceptable
behavioral specifications. For example, Lovell [14] combines the buffer stock
model and the flexible accelerator which he reduces to a behavioral rela-
tionship between actual stocks and expected sales, actual sales and lagged
stocks. Not only does this specification require sales expectations data,
but it appears to suffer from a weak assumption. A major weakness
is that the model assumes that the partial adjustment specification operates
between planned and desired inventories. Thus, Equation lb) becomes:
Ip - I X(I - I 2)
where IP is planned inventories, and the other variables are defined ast
in Equation lb). While there are reasons why actual stocks can only adjust
partially to desired levels (as is discussed below), I see little reason
1 For a good summary of the full equational specification, see [13],
pp. 65-67.
2 Such as that completed by the Office of Business Economics (OBE)
quarterly surveys. For a critical discussion of this data, see [11],
Chapters 1 and 2.
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why plans do not adjust to desires quickly enough to render this specification
inappropriate. It implies a lack of rational planning, particularly for annual
data. Clearly, actual inventories will not meet planned levels always. However,
Equation 2 is mute as to reasons why plans cannot at least approximate "desires"
(X `l)or what causes this consistent inability to plan.
In light of these considerations, the form of the modified flexible
accelerator seems most appropriate. However, it requires remodifications.l
The "remodified flexible accelerator" to be used here combines a specification
of desired inventories plus a partial adjustment specification of the
relationship between actual inventory changes and desired changes as follows:
It* 0 + 1 Qt + 2 DSTE2Pt +3 (P+ Pt )
= a + 1 t t +a 2DSTEt+ a3 (  _ t)
Pt (3a)
It t-l = (I It_l) + F (X,Y,Z) (3b)
or (It- It_l) X(I - It-I) = F (X,Y,Z)
Equation (3a) relates desired inventories in year t to expected production
in year t, to strike activity expected in year t to take place in year t+l
(i.e., DSTE2, an expected strike dummy), and to expected price changes
(capital gains) of the inventoried commodity from t to t+l. For both pro-
ducers'inventories of final product and consumers inventories of factor
inputs, the priors are al > 0, a 2 > , a 3 > 0. Equation 3a) identifies
a mix of precautionary, transactions and speculative motives for inventory
demand.
1
A number of interesting modifications have been pursued and tested
in [11], Chapter 6.
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Equation 3b) is the usual partial adjustment specification with the
additional identification of factors affecting actual inventory behavior
and its relation to desired inventory behavior. F is a function of market
conditions, current strike activity, and costs of holding inventories --
all of which will affect the hypothesized relation between actual and
desired inventory behavior.
Linearizing F and incorporating proxies for these factors for the
U.S. copper industry, we obtain:
It -It_1 = (I - Itl) + x1 (RPLMEt - RPEMJt) + DUMST2t (3b)
+ 3 ACCEPt
(RPLME - RPEMJ) is the difference in year t between thn real nrice (RP) of
copper on the London Metals Exchange (LME) and the real price (RP) of copper
quoted in the copper trade journal, Fngineering and Mining Journal (EMJ).
RPLME is a short-run competitive price reflecting world supply and demand;
RPEMJ is the primary producers "group price determined by the goals of the
oligopolistic primary producers.l The difference reflects the extent of
excess demand in the U.S. copper market in a given year. Thus when (RPLME-
RPEMJ) is great, U.S. markets are in disequilibrium since RPEMJ is main-
2tained well below international market clearing prices. DUMST2 is a strike
dummy indicating the number of months of strike in the U.S. copper industry
(at the smelting and refining stages) in year t. ACCEPt is the annual average
90-day bankers acceptance rate, which is felt to reflect the non-warehousing
costs of holding inventories.
1 See [2,3,8] for much greater clarification of the structure of the
industry.
2 I do not discuss why the primary producers would maintain desired
prices below world market levels. See [8] chapter 1, and its footnotes for
discussion, speculation and relevant sources. My interest here is the
effects of those desires on inventory behavior. Of course, such price
maintainance motives are assumed only for the period of estimation.
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The priors for 3b are: X < , A2 < 0, A3 < O. For example, in a
"demand crunch" period (world copper prices well above U.S. primary pro-
ducer price) when primary producers are disgorging stocks to help maintain
an oligopolistic price below short-run competitive levels and/or when
strike activity limits production and necessitates sales from inventory
and/or when the costs of holding inventories are high, ceteris paribus, the
actual inventory increases on the part of those primary producers will be
less than desired.
Combining 3a) and 3b) and introducing a disturbance term, 1 we obtain:
e Pe
t t-l X + l Qt + 2 DSTE2 + Xa3(l -P t -
t
+ Xl (RPLMEt - RPEMJt) + 2 DUMST2t + X3 ACCEPt + t (4a)
or,
t : A O + l Qt +2 DSTE2 t +3 (RPLMEt - RPEMJt)
+ A2 DUMST2t + A3 ACCEPt + (l-X) It_l + t (4b)
1The stochastic assumptions merit some discussion. If Equations
3a) and 3b) both have disturbance terms and e , respectively, then
E = + e. and the distribution of E is etermige by assumptions regarding
1 and 2. Thus, if 1 N (0, a2 ) , 2 N (0, N ( +a 2) if
cov (1 ) = 0. Many analysts reat 3a) as a 2non-stochastic lequagion,
making £ 2 £2. In any case, Equations 3a) and 3b) re estimated as part of
a larger system determining both actual and expectational variables. As
discussed below, 2SLS techniques were used to insure consistent estimates
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2. RESULTS
The estimation results for 4b) for the oligopolistic primary producers
and the competitive secondary refiners and fabricators/semi-fabricators
are given in Table 1. The estimates come from a simultaneous econometric
model of the U.S. copper industry [8]; 2SLS/Hildeth-Lu and/or 2SLS/Cochrane-
Orcutt techniques were used. The variables are defined fully in Appendix A.
A number of alternative expectational price variables have been
utilized. pet+l is proxied by simple averages of future prices. Two alter-
natives for Pe tried were copper futures contracts prices PFUT1 andt+l
PFUT7, which differ only in timing of delivery of the futures contracts
(see Appendix A). Alternative forms of the expectational price variables
include a non-linear 1 form (RPFUT1 - RPPR and a linear form (RPFUT1 - RPEMJ).
RPPR
Qt is usually proxied by actual Qt (production level of the group being
analyzed). Some empirical work suggests this is a good approach: for
example, actual sales realizations have been shown to be decent proxy for
sales anticipations.2 Furthermore, the use of actual realizations for
expectations is a "rational expectations" formulation.
Using the data [5], Equation 4b) is estimated on an annual basis.
However, the various models can be formulated in terms of end-of-year,
beginning-of-year, or monthly average inventory positions. The specification
1 RPPR is the real primary producers price while RPEMJ is the real
Engineering and Mining Journal (EMJ) primary producer price. The prices
are almost identical. See [2, 8] and Appendix A.
2 See an excellent discussion and empirical test of alternative
sales expectations models including the Ferber Law of Expectations, the
adaptive expectations model and rational expectations models in Hirsch
and Lovell, [11], Chapter 5.
-10-
in Equations 3a and 3b) for the copper industry are most relevant for
analyzing the behavior of average monthly inventory positions in a given
year. However, the consistent body of data available 5], for all three
producer groups quantifies only year-end inventory positions. Thus,
most estimates of the inventory equation in Table 1 utilize It as end-
of-year inventory levels in year t. However, to assess the sensitivity
of the behavioral specification, I have also used as It the simple annual
average end-of-month inventory position (IRRAV) for year t. This has
been estimated for primary refiners alone.
The results are discussed for the three producer groups. Only a
few specifications are detailed which represent those judged best.
I Primary Refiners' Inventories of Refined Copper
Equations Ai, Aii and Aiii) examine the hypothesized model for the
oligopolistic producers when inventories are defined on a monthly average
basis for the year (IRRAVt). Aiv) and Av) use end-of-year inventory
estimates. My intent here is to examine only the sign and statistical
significance of the estimated coefficients; therefore, direct hypotheses
regarding the s al' a2 and a3 are not examined and these parameters
are not separately estimated here (which would have required maximum like-
lihood assumptions).l
In Equation Ai) all coefficients are the correct sign except Xa1
(the coefficient of QPR) and X 3. Neither are significantly different
1 In 4b), the signs of Xal, Xa2 and Xat3 should be the same as a,
0 2' a because X >0.
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from zero; likewise,Xt 0 is not significantly different from zero.
Equation Aii) is identical except the constant has been dropped. A
Fisher-Chow test reveals that one cannot reject H :a 0 = 0, while
Equation Aiii) furhter indicates that one cannot reject H0:-a 3 = 0.
In Equation Aii), all coefficients are the correct sign:Xa 1, ,-and
(1-) are all significant at the 99% level, while Xo2 and 2 are
significant at the 80-90% level. is between 0 and 1, as expected. The
results suggest that an accelerator relation to QPR is operative. Like-
wise, strike and price expectations do affect desired inventory levels.
The price expectation coefficient is not significant, however. Furthermore,
while the hypothesized determinants of desired stocks appear operative,
actual stocks are adjusted to desired levels in light of market conditions
(X1) and actual strike2 conditions (x2). Apparently, costs of holding
inventories as proxied by the cost of money (ACCEP) has little effect
upon the relation of actual inventory changes to desired changes.
Finally, Equation Aiii) suggests (as do all others) that active
inventory policy characterizes the oligopoly,as has been hypothesized earl-
ier. That discretionary inventory policy is utilized for price expectation
and strike reasons. Furthermore, inventory policy is also utilized as an
1 Asymptotically, an F test or likelihood ratio test. This is the
usual test utilizing the sum of squared residuals of an unconstrained and
constrained coefficient vectors. That is, (E*'E* - E'E)/r F(r, n-K).
E'E/n-K
2 The strike dummy used by CRA [3] was also used and compared with my
strike dummy. The results were similar.
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Aalternative to pricing policy. The sign and significance ofA 1 suggest
the primary producers do use inventories to help support the "administered"
EMJ price. Thus, when (RPLME - RPEMJ) is large and positive, and pressure
is exerted upon the EMJ price; inventories are drawn down (relative to
levels determined by the other inventory motives) in order to support
the group price. If the price difference is negative and downward press-
ure is exerted on the EMJ price, inventories are built up to support that
price.
Equations Aiv) and Av) utilize the same equational specification,
but use the end-of-year inventory variable (IRR). Notice, as a result,
the coefficient of DSTE2 is insignificant in Aiv) and H: Xc2 = O
cannot be rejected using a Fisher-Chow test. Thus, Equation Aiii)
indicates that expectations of strikes in year t+l affect monthly average
inventory positions in year t positively. However, the use of year-end
inventory estimates in the equations Aiv) and Av) masks any build-up
that would have occurred in expectation of a strike if that build-up
starts to be drawn down near the end of the year.2 That build-up would
be reflected in monthly average inventory numbers, but is lost in the
difference between year-end levels.
In any case, the use of a consistent body of data for the analysis
of competitive and non-competitive segments of the domestic copper
industry has argued for the use of year-end estimates3. On the whole,
Incidentally, in light of a continually recurrent three-year
contract pattern, these strike expectations are generally relatively good.
2 For example, during the severe 1967/1968 strike.
The differences in results from the alternative inventory data
should be most pronounced for the oligopolists, since they have more
complicated inventory behavior. However, as noted in the text, the
empirical results are fairly similar for the oligopoly.
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the results are still quite good. In spite of the use of IRR for
Equation Aiv) Xal, Xa3 and X1 are significant at the 99% level. X3
is still insignificant although now of the correct sign. Strike activity
is diminished in its impacts, both in expectational and actual form. X
is now insignificant but greater than 1, which does not accord with the
model in Equation 3b. Of course, it could happen if market conditions
consistently forced actual inventory changes to be greater than desired
changes. Given the relative insignificance of (1-X), however, the fact
that X > 1 has not been analyzed deeply. However, the general insignifi-
cance of (1-X) in Ai) - Av) indicates that one cannot generally reject
the hypothesis that X = 1. This implies that not only do the primary
producers have fairly sophisticated inventory behavior but also that
the adjustment of actual inventory to desired levels occurs quickly.
This interpretation further emphasizes the oligopolistic use of inventor-
ies as an active tool.
In Equation Av), Xa1, XA3 and X1 are again all significant at the
99% level and 2 and X are significant at between the 80% and 90% level
(i.e., insignificant by normal rules of thumb). Fisher-Chow tests could
not reject the null hypothesis that the other coefficients were zero.
The signs of the coefficients are as expected.
Aiv) and Av) suggest that not only is there an accelerator effect
operative, but also that price expectations are insignificant but actual
strikes and market conditions (RPLME - RPEMJ) do limit the ability
of the oligopolistic primary producers to adjust actual inventories to
desired levels (as seen in all A) equations).
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I Secondary and Custom Refiners' and Smelters' Inventories of Scrap
The secondary refiners are "workably" competitive in both the product
and factor markets [2, 8]. While competitive producers will also have a
mix of transactions and speculative motives for holding inventories, it
is the hypothesis of this paperl that the importance and use of inventory
policy will be less pronounced for such competitive groups. This hypothesis
is borne out by initial econometric estimation of Equation 4b) in its
complete form. The only parameter estimate significantly different from
zero in such a complete specification is Xa 1 the accelerator term.
Upon reflection, it is not surprising that many of the parameter
estimates are not significantly different from zero. Actual and expected
strike activity at the smelting and refining stage of production do not
affect factor supply from the scrap market in any substantial fashion.2
Hence, stockpiling scrap in expectation of a strike and/or drawing down
inventories of scrap during an actual strike is not expected or hypothe-
sized; thus, it is expected that Xa2 and 2 are never significantly
different from zero. Furthermore, 3 is never significantly different
from zero.3 The price expectation variable (RPFUT1 - RPEMJ) is not
significant.4
1 And others; see [21], Chap. 5.
2 If factor prices rise, competitive product prices will also rise.
Which coincides with the results for the primary refiners.
4 A proper speculative price expectation variable would haxe dealt
with the expected changes in the real price of scrap (e.g., (RPS - RPS)/
RPS)), where RPSe would be a futures price or an expected futures price
of scrap. However, an easily accessible future price series does not
exist; furthermore, RPFUT1 should be a workable proxy for RPSe. The sign
of the estimated coefficient of (RPFUT1 - RPEMJ) is generally the opposite
of that hypothesized. However, the estimate is never significant at
acceptable levels. 17
It appears therefore that desired stocks are basically driven by a
simple accelerator model (Xal > O) and that market conditions [as
reflected by (RPLME - RPEMJ)] may affect the partial adjustment of actual
to desired inventory levels ( > 0). Actual strikes and costs of holding
inventories have no reasonable effect upon the partial adjustment process.
Speculative price and strike expectations do not affect desired inventory
levels.
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* Fabricators and Semi-Fabricators Inventories of Scrap and Refined Copper
Three equations are presented for the inventory behavior of the fabri-
cators and semi-fabricators. Although the motives for holding inventories
can differ for a consuming and producing group, it is again felt that Equation
4b is an adequate general behavioral representation for the fabricators'
demand for scrap and refined copper (i.e., material input inventories). Ini-
tial tests indicated that one could not reject the hypothesis that the
constant term and the coefficient of (RPLME - RPEMJ) were zero. Hence,
the first equation listed, Equation Ci) does not include those terms.
Thus, while the market condition proxy had a strong effect upon the
inventory behavior of the primary refiners (leading to inventory behavior
to defend the group price), it has little effect upon fabricators'
inventory behavior. This is further indication that inventory policy is
a more active price maintenance tool of the oligopolistic primary producers,
as hypothesized. While some of the fabricators (about 1/3 by production
capacity) are extensions of the vertically-integrated primary producers,
there exist many other independent fabricators and semi-fabricators. In
light of the non-oligopolistic character of the fabricators/semi-fabrica-
tors and their lack of desire to defend RPEMJ, it is not surprising that
inventory behavior is not affected by (RPLME - RPEMJ).1
The signs of the coefficients in Equation Ci) are as expected, except for
X3. However, only Xaland (1- ) are significant at the 99% level. In
fact, a Fisher-Chow test indicates that one cannot reject HO:Xa 2 =Xa 3= Al
= X = , at any reasonable level. Equation Ciii) embodies this con-3 0
clusion, relating IF to production (QFAB), actual strikes and lagged inventory
1 Although their inventories could have been drawn down in the face of the
general excess demand proxied by (RPLME - RPEMJ); apparently, they weren't.
-1 9-
levels. Thus, little discretionary activity is reflected in the fabricators/
semi-fabricators inventory behavior: an accelerator formulation is successful
in explaining desired inventory levels and actual strike activity is almost
successful (almost at the 90% level) in helping explain the difference between
actual and desired inventory changes.
-20-
3. CONCLUSION - INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS
The conclusions of this paper are easily summarized in Table 2;
the hypotheses that, first, a desired inventory/sales ratio characterize
most producers and second, that differential inventory behavior exists
in competitive and non-competitive market settings have been supported.
A model of inventory behavior permitting a fairly rich examination of
potential motives for holding inventories has been specified and estimated
for an oligopolistic group of refined copper producers and for two compe-
titive groups of copper producers. The results suggest that oligopolistic
inventory behavior is substantially more complicated and sophisticated
than that of competitive producers. The parameter estimates for the
oligopolistic group are uniformly more significant and the residual
variance of the estimated equations is uniformly less.
Estimates for the competitive groups indicate that only a transactions
motive is a statistically significant (at usual levels) explanatory factor
for desired inventory. Using estimates of X~1 and in equations Bi) and
Ciii), the estimate of al can be easily obtained. al is the estimate the
desired inventory/production ratio for the competitive groups. For the
secondary refiners we have al = .22 and for the fabricators/semi-fabricators
we have al = .069.
For the oligopolistic primary producers, a much wider range of inven-
tory motives and uses are evidenced. Using somewhat relaxed statistical
significance criteria (at the 80-90% level) the results suggest transactions
motives (Xa1); strike (Xa2) and price (Xat3) expectational motives; and
price stabilization motives in response to short-run market conditions (X1)
1 A ^Given the necessary assumptions to make Xa1 and maximum likeli-
hood estimates.
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explain primary producer inventory behavior. Applying the usual signifi-
cance criteria in Aiii) and Av), we find that the primary producers have
a desired inventory/production ratio (.079 in Aiii) and .073 in Av)).
However, in Av) the primary producers hold inventories for expected capital
gains ( = 2.60) and they lower inventory holdings (from average) in the
face of short-run market price disequilibrium given their group price
(X = -3.2435). Thus, using the estimates in Av), if price expectations
suggested a 5 rise in the copper prices in t+l (i.e., RPFUT1 - RPEMJ
were expected to rise by 5), the change in primary producer inventory
levels in t (IRRt - IRRt l) would be increased 13000 short tons.
If at the same time, short-run market disequilibria increased excess
demand, given the fixed primary producers price (e.g., RPLME - RPEMJ = 5),
the primary producers would draw down inventories 16,220 short-tons to
help meet that excess demand while maintaining their fixed price. Finally
in 4 of the 5 equations in A) the hypothesis thatX = 1 cannot be rejected.
This suggests that not only do the primary producers have a wider range
of factors affecting their inventory behavior but also that they react
quickly to adjust actual inventory to desired levels.
-22-
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APPENDIX A
VARIABLE1 DEFINITIONS AND THEIR SOURCES
1. ACCEP
2. DSTE2
3. DUMST2
4. IF
5. IFR
6. IFS
7. IRR
8. IRRAV
Annual average, 90-day bankers' acceptances. Source:
Federal Reserve Board of Governors, Federal Resource
Bulletin.
Dummy variable indicating whether a strike is expected
next year and how many months it is expected to last.
For example, if a 2-1/2 month strike is expected to
affect between 75-100% of production next year, DSTE2
= 2.5. DSTE2 = 0 if no strike is expected. (DSTE2(t)
= DUMST2(t+l)).
Dummy variable for strikes affecting the smelting and
refining stages of copper production. Dummy estimates
number of months a major strike affected more than 75%
of the production workers in the industry; 0.0 when no
strike. Source: Interviews with Asarco, Phelps Dodge,
Kennecott and Anaconda.
Fabricators stocks of copper, both scrap and refined
(IF = IFS + IFR). AIF = IF(t) - IF(t-l).
Refined copper stocks held by wire mills, brass mills
and other fabricators and semi-fabricators, end of year.
Source: CDA, Table 1, Item 16.
Scrap stocks held by brass mills, foundries and other
fabricators and semi-fabricators, end of year. Source:
CDA, Table 2, Item 3.
Refined copper stocks held at refineries, end of year.
Source: CDA, Table 1, Item 16. AIRR = IRR(t) - IRR(t-1).
Stocks of refined copper in the United States at refinery
on consignment at the end of each month. Figures include
refined copper in United States regardless of origin.
ABMS figures in Metal Statistics.
1 All quantity series in ,OUO short tons. Variables in alphabetical order.
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9. IRS
10. PEMJ
11. PFUT1
12. PFUT7
13. PLME
14. PPR
15. PS
Scrap stocks held by smelters and refineries, end of year.
Source: CDA, Table 2, Item 3. AIRS = IRS(t) - IRS(t-1).
Metals Week (formerly E&MJ Metal and Mining Markets) average
domestic refinery price of electrolytic copper wire bars and
ingot bars, FOB refinery; also tabulated in the Yearbook of
the American Bureau of Metal Statistics (ABMS) as monthly
average prices of copper, domestic refinery--New York--¢/lb.
Simple average of Closing Future Price (/lb) of copper for
all of the next 12 months reported starting in January of
the year. Source: Wall Street Journal.
Simple average of Closing Future Prices (/lb) of copper for
all of the next 12 months reported starting in July of year.
Source: Wall Street Journal.
The London Metals Exchange Price of Copper: electrolytic,
delivered for 1946 to 1953; electrolytic wire bars monthly
average settlement price for 1953 to 1974. Asked quotation
for spot is converted to /lb by the annual average exchange
rate for sterling. Both series found in ABMS Yearbook--
"Average Prices of Principal Metals," (p. 147 in the 1973
Yearbook).
Producers' prices of electrolytic copper delivered United
States destinations. Averaged from quotations published
daily in American Metal Market, in /lb. Source: Metal
Statistics.
From 1956 on, dealers' buying price for No. 2 heavy copper
scrap; before 1956, dealers' buying price for No. 1 heavy
copper scrap. /lb--Metal Statistics.
Wholesale price index of durable manufacturing, 1967 = 100.
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
17. PUWD74 Wholesale price index of durable manufacturing, 1974 = 100.
Source: BLS.
Supply of mill, foundry and power products to domestic
market - total. Source: CDA, Table 4.
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16. PUWD
18. QFAB
19. QPR Total production of refined copper from Primary Sources.
Source: Copper Development Association (CDA), Table 1,
Item 13. Series is adjusted to include refined copper
produced from scrap and sold at the primary producers'
price and to exclude copper produced from ore yet sold
in the secondary market.
20. QSR Production of refined copper in the United States produced
from scrap. Source: CDA, Table 1, Item 13. Series is
adjusted to include copper produced from ore and sold in
the outside market and to exclude copper produced from
scrap and sold at the primary producers' price.
21. RPEMJ Deflated PEMJ. Deflator is alternatively PUWD or PUWD74.
22. RPFUT1 PFUT1 deflated by PUWD or PUWD74.
23. RPFUT7 PFUT7 deflated by PUWD or PUWD74.
24. RPLME Deflated LME price of copper (PLME deflated by PUWD or
PUWD74) in /lb.
25. RPS The real price of scrap, PS, deflated by PUWD or PUWD74.
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